References

Ansburg, P.I., & Hill, K. (2003) Creative and analytic thinkers differ in their use of attentional resources. Personality and Individual Differences 34, pp. 1141–1152. 

Avigad, J. (2008) Understanding Proofs. In: P. Mancosu (ed.) The Philosophy of Mathematical Practice (pp. 317-351). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Bangu, S. (2015) Progress, Understanding, and Unification. In: I. Toader, G. Sandu & I. Pârvu (eds.), Romanian Studies in Philosophy of Science (pp. 239-253). Dordrecht: Springer.

Bealer, G. (2000) A Theory of the A Priori. Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 81, pp. 1-30.

Bengson, J. (2015) A Noetic Theory of Understanding and Intuition as Sense-Maker. Inquiry 58, pp. 633-668.

Bird, Al. (2012) What can cognitive science tell us about scientific revolutions? Theoria 75, pp. 293-321.

BonJour, L. (2001) A moderate rationalism. In: In defense of pure reason (pp. 98-129). Cambridge University Press.  

Bourget, D. (2017) The Role of Consciousness in Grasping and Understanding. Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 95, pp. 285-318.

Bowden, E.M., Jung-Beeman, M., Fleck, J. & Kounios, J. (2005) New approaches to demystifying insight. Trends in Cognitive Sciences 9, pp. 322-328.

Carey, S. (2009) Beyond Core Object Cognition. The Process of Conceptual Change. In: The Origin of Concepts (pp. 361-446). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Carter, J.A., & Pritchard, D. (2016) Cognitive Bias, Scepticism and Understanding. In:  St.R. Grimm, C. Baumberger & S. Ammon (eds.), Explaining Understanding (pp. 272-292). London: Routledge.

Chudnoff, E. (2013) Is Intuition Based On Understanding? Philosophy and Phenomenological Research 86, pp. 42-67. 

Cianciolo, A.T., Matthew, C., Sternberg, R.J., & Wagner, R.W. (2006) Tacit Knowledge, Practical Intelligence, and Expertise. In: K.A. Ericsson, N. Charness, P.J. Feltovich,‎ & R.R. Hoffman (eds.), The Cambridge Handbook of Expertise and Expert Performance (pp. 613-632). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Cooper N. (1994) The Inaugural Address: Understanding. Proceedings of the Aristotelian Society, Suppl. Vol. 68, pp. 1-26.

Dellsén, F. (forthcoming) Beyond Explanation: Understanding as Dependency Modeling. British Journal for the Philosophy of Science. Online first.

de Regt, H.W. (2004) Discussion Note: Making Sense of Understanding. Philosophy of Science 71, pp. 98-109.

Elgin, C.Z. (1992) Understanding: Art and Science. Synthese 95, pp. 13-28.

Elgin, C.Z. (2004) True Enough. Philosophical Issues 14, pp. 113–131.

Friedman, M. (2002) Kant, Kuhn, and the rationality of science. Philosophy of Science 69, pp. 171-190.

Goldfarb, W. (1992) Wittgenstein on Understanding. Midwest Studies in Philosophy 17, pp. 109-122.

Gopnik, A. (1998) Explanation as Orgasm. Minds and Machines 8, pp. 101-118.

Grimm, St.R. (2014) Understanding as Knowledge of Causes. In: A. Fairweather (ed.), Virtue Epistemology Naturalized (pp. 329-345). Dordrecht: Springer.

Hills, A. (2015) Understanding Why. Noûs 49, pp. 661-688.

Kahneman, D. (2002) Thinking, Fast and Slow. New York: Farrar, Straus and Giroux.

Kaplan, C.A., & Simon, H.A. (1990) In search of insight. Cognitive Psychology 22, pp. 374-419.

Kelp, Chr. (2015) Understanding phenomena. Synthese 192, pp. 3799-3816.

Khalifa, K. (2012) Inaugurating Understanding or Repackaging Explanation? Philosophy of Science 79, pp. 15-37.

Kubovy, M. (1999) On the Pleasures of the Mind. In: D.Kahneman, E.Diener & N.Schwartz (eds.), Well-being: The Foundations of Hedonic Psychology. New York: Russell Sage Foundation.

Kuhn, Th.S. (1962/2012) The Structure of Scientific Revolutions. Chicago University Press.

Kvanvig, J. (2003) Knowledge and Understanding. In: The Value of Knowledge and the Pursuit of Understanding (pp. 185-203). New York: Cambridge University Press.

Lipton, P. (2009) Understanding without Explanation. In: H.W. De Regt, S. Leonelli & K.Eigner (eds.), Scientific Understanding: Philosophical Perspectives (pp .43-63). University of Pittsburgh Press.

Lynch, M. (2017) Understanding and Coming to Understand. In: St. R. Grimm (ed.), Making Sense of the World: New Essays on the Philosophy of Understanding. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Mele, A.R. (1997) Agency and Mental Action. Philosophical Perspectives 11, pp. 231-249.

Metzinger, Th. (2015) M-Autonomy. Journal of Consciousness Studies 22, pp. 270-302.

Morgan, M.S. & Morrison, M. (1999) Models as Mediators. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Nakamura, J. & Csikszentmihalyi, M. (2002) The Concept of Flow. In: C.R. Snyder & S.J. Lopez (eds.), Handbook of positive psychology. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Nersessian, N.J. (2002) The Cognitive Basis of modeling Reasoning in Science. In: P. Carruthers, St. Stich & M. Siegal (eds.), The Cognitive Basis of Science (pp. 133-153). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

Niiniluoto, I. (2002) Critical Scientific Realism. Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Pritchard, D. (2005) Cognitive Responsibility and the Epistemic Virtues. In: Epistemic Luck (pp. 181-201). Oxford: Oxford University Press.

Saul, J. (2013) Scepticism and Implicit Bias. Disputatio 37, pp. 243-264.

Strevens, M. (2013) No understanding without explanation. Studies in History and Philosophy of Science 44, pp. 510-515.

Thagard, P., & Stewart, T.C. (2011) The AHA! Experience: Creativity Through Emergent Binding in Neural Networks. Cognitive Science 35, pp. 1-33.

Toulmin, St. E. (1972) Human Understanding. Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press.

Trout, J.D. (2002) Scientific Explanation And The Sense Of Understanding. Philosophy of Science 69, pp. 213-233.

van Fraassen, B. (1999) How is Scientific Revolution / Conversion Possible? Proceedings of the American Catholic Philosophical Association 73, pp. 63-80.

van Riel, R. (2015) The Content of Model-Based Information. Synthese 192, pp. 3839-3858.

Wilkenfeld, D.A. (2013) Understanding as representation manipulability. Synthese 190, pp. 997-1016.

Ylikoski, P., & Kuorikoski, J. (2010) Dissecting explanatory power. Philosophical Studies 148, pp. 201-219.

Zagzebski, L. (2001) Recovering Understanding. In: M. Steup (ed.), Knowledge, Truth, and Duty: Essays on Epistemic Justification, Responsibility, and Virtue (pp. 235-249). Oxford: Oxford University Press.